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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH

LORI WARNER,
Applicant/Petitioner,
vs.
Case: 970335-CA
Priority Classification 7

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
MERIT MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC., and :
TIG INSURANCE CO.,
Defendants/Respondents.

BRIEF OF PETITIONER LORI WARNER

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to former Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-86
(1988) and current Utah Code Section 34A-1-303 (1997) as this is an appeal from a final Order
of the Industrial Commission (now renamed the Labor Commission).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the Industrial Commission erroneously interpreted and applied the law

relative to the higher legal standard of causation under Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d
15 (Utah 1986) in light of the facts of the Applicant's injury.
The standard of review is correction of error in erroneous interpretation or application of
the law. Section 63-46b-16(4)(c), U.C.A. and King v. Industrial Commission, 850 P.2d 1281
(Utah App. 1993). There is no specific or implied grant of discretion to the Industrial

1

Commission in the interpretation of the law. See King, id.
2.

Whether the Industrial Commission erroneously interpreted and applied the law

relative to application of Section 35-l-77(2)(d), U.C.A. in rejecting the conclusions of the
medical panel in favor of a medical report previously obtained by the insurance carrier.
The standard of review is correction of error in erroneous interpretation or application of
the law. Section 63-46b-16(4)(c), U.C.A. and King v. Industrial Commission. 850 P.2d 1281
(Utah App. 1993). There is no specific or implied grant of discretion to the Industrial
Commission in the interpretation of the law. See King, id.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
We believe that Section 35-l-77(2)(d), U.C.A. is controlling on the second issue. This
section states, in pertinent part:
(d) The commission may base its finding and decision on the report of
the panel, medical director, or medical consultants, but is not bound by the
report if other substantial conflicting evidence in the case supports a contrary
finding.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Procedural History
Lori Warner filed an application for hearing with the Industrial Commission on June
22, 1994, seeking compensation and benefits for a low back injury that occurred at work. R. at
2. An amended application was filed with the Commission on August 22, 1995 in which Ms.
Warner alleged a cumulative injury due to repetitive bending, twisting and lifting at work
culminating in low back injury on March 24, 1995. R. at 31.
2

Ms. Warner's claim was heard before an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial
Commission on February 6, 1996. A medical panel appointed by the ALJ subsequently saw
Ms. Warner and the panel issued a report following an examination by the panel of the
applicant and her medical records and films. R. at 412-419. No timely objections were filed by
either party to the medical panel report. The medical panel concluded that a causal relationship
exists between Ms. Warner's work activities and her low back problems. She was given a 5%
impairment rating for her low back condition with 4/5 due to pre-existing conditions and 1/5
due to her work activities. R. at 418.
The ALJ issued her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on September 13,
1996. R, at 425-439. In this order, the ALJ found and concluded that Ms. Warner had met
her burden of legal and medical causation and appropriate benefits were awarded.
The Defendants filed a timely Motion for Review with the Industrial Commission on
October 11, 1996 and the Petitioner responded on October 29. 1996. R. at 440-447 and 449 45 L The Commissioners of the Industrial Commission issued the Order Granting Motion for
Review on March 17, 1997. R. at 453-461. This order denied Ms. Warner's claim by
concluding that her actions resulting in her injury did not meet the higher causational standard
required by Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), regarding a person with
a pre-existing back condition. Two of the three Commissioners also rejected the report of the
medical panel and instead adopted the opinions of doctors who provided a report on Ms.
Warner for the insurance carrier. Hence, the Commissioner concluded that medical causation
was not met. R. at 457-458.
The Petitioner filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration on April 7, 1997. R. at 4623

465. An Order Extending Time for Reconsideration allowing the Industrial Commission until
May 6, 1997 to issue a decision was entered on April 8, 1997. R. at 466-468. The Industrial
Commission's Order Denying Request for Reconsideration was issued on May 2, 1997. R. at
469-473.
The Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Review with this Court on Monday June 2,
1997. R. at 477-478.
Factual History
1.

Lori Warner worked full time for Merit Medical Systems, Inc. as a molding

operator from January of 1995 up to March 23, 1995. Her job involved collecting and
transporting plastic medical parts that were produced by a number of large molding machines
assembled in a large room. R. at 453, 454. These machines operated 24 hours a day. Each
machine would produce parts that dropped into five pound plastic bins or totes. She was
responsible for collecting the output of three machines, and would also cover for co-workers
when they were on breaks or at lunch. R. at 454 and 426-428.
2.

Ms. Warner would empty the contents of the totes on a average of nine times

per hour and carry them across the room to a weigh station where she would lift the tote onto
the waist height scales to be weighed, and would then remove it from the scales and place it on
the floor for others in QA, quality assurance, to process further. She would do this about 72
times in an 8 hour shift.

The bins or totes weighed between 5 and 26 pounds depending upon

the parts they contained and the quantity accumulated therein. Some bins which collected
larger parts were located on the floor by their machine, others with smaller parts were located
at about waist height on the machines. R. at 454 and 428.
4

3.

Because she was afraid of receiving electric shocks from some machines, she

stood as far away as possible from the machines, which required her to lean over to lift or pull
the bins from the machines or the floor. R. at 454, 428.
4.

Ms. Warner's job duties also included occasionally checking the size of the

parts for quality control, and she would also vacuum and clean around the machines. She
remained busy throughout her entire shift with no time to sit. R. at 454 and 428.
5.

Ms. Warner awoke on March 24, 1995 with back pain that radiated into her

right buttocks and leg. She also had difficulty walking. She initially went to Instacare for
treatment and then went to Dr. J. Lynn Smith for care. After conservative care failed to
alleviate her pain, Dr. Smith performed back surgery on June 6, 1995. R. at 454-455 and 429431.
6.

Prior to March 24, 1995, Ms. Warner was not having low back pain or

difficulties. She had one prior back injury that had occurred about nine years previously when
she slipped in the shower. She saw a doctor following the incident and within a few days had
no more symptoms or problems. R. at 431.
7.

Dr. Smith stated the opinion that although there was evidence of pre-existing

conditions in the lower back, Ms. Warner's medical condition relative to her low back after
March 24, 1995 was related to her bending and lifting activities at work over the course of her
employment. R. at 381.
7.

She was examined on or about January 22, 1996 by Dr. Gerald Moress and Dr.

Wallace Hess at the request of the employer's insurance carrier. These doctors issued a report
to the insurance carrier denying medical causation following this exam. They felt because
5

there was no pain prior to March 24, 1994 or single event at work that caused pain, and
because of the pre-existing condition, that there was no relationship between the applicant's
work and the low back problems that began on March 24, 1995. R. at 396-408.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Industrial Commission erred in interpreting and applying the law of the Allen case
under the circumstances of Ms. Warner's claim, especially in light of the holding in Nyrehn v.
Industrial Commission, 800 P.2d 330 (Utah App. 1990). Under the facts adopted by the
Industrial Commission, we must reach the conclusion that Ms. Warner's extensive lifting and
bending activities at work resulted in a legally compensable injury.
The Industrial Commission also erred in its wholesale rejection of the uncontroverted
report of the medical panel in favor of the report of the insurance carrier's reviewing doctors,
which report had been reviewed by the medical panel in its assessment of the medical aspects
of the claim. There was no new substantial conflicting evidence upon which to base such a
rejection.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
The Industrial Commission Improperly
Interpreted and Applied the Law Relative to the Higher Standard
of Causation under Allen v. Industrial Commission
Upon the Respondents' Motion for Review, the Commissioners of the Industrial
Commission reversed the order of the A.LJ. and ruled that Ms. Warner's accident was not
compensable because she had not established both legal and medical causation. Their rationale
regarding legal causation was that her actions did not meet the higher exertion standards
6

required by the Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) decision. The
Commissioners overturned the conclusions of the A.L.J, that the Petitioner's exertions did
indeed meet the higher standard. There was no substantial change between the facts found in
the ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order and the facts used by the
Commissioners in the Order Granting Motion for Review.
To meet the legal causation requirement, the Allen decision requires a claimant with a
pre-existing condition to "show that the employment contributed something substantial to
increase the risk he already faced in everyday life because of his condition." Allen. 729 P.2d
at 25.
This requirement helps to distinguish between injuries which
(a) coincidentally occur at work because a preexisting condition results in
symptoms which appear during work hours without any enhancement from the
workplace, and (b) those injuries which occur because some condition or
exertion of employment increases the risk of injury which the worker normally
faces in everyday life.
Allen, id.
The Court in Allen recognized that the issue must be determined on the facts of each
case. Allen at 25. The facts are not in dispute here.
We submit that the law was improperly applied to the facts of this case by the
Commissioners. Their interpretation of Allen is incorrect and is also at odds with the decision
reached in Nyrehn v. Industrial Commission. 800 P.2d 330 (Utah App. 1990).
In the Nyrehn case, the applicant was a stock room clerk who would sort and price
merchandise located in tubs. The tubs weighed between fifteen and forty pounds, depending
upon their contents. Ms. Nyrehn would lift and carry these tubs to and from the sorting area

about thirty to thirty-six times per day. She was also involved in constant bending and stooping
in the sorting of the merchandise. She had been doing this job for about 2 lA months before she
began having low back pain.
This Court found that the work-related exertion which caused her injury exceeded, as
stated in Allen, the "usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life."
In the case before us it is unquestionable that two and a half months of
lifting tubs of merchandise 30 to 36 times per day would cause unusual and
extraordinary wear and tear on a body when compared with the "usual wear and
tear and exertions of nonemployment life." Allen, 729 P.2d at 26. The test is
not whether the type of exertion which caused the injury is unknown in
nonemployment life, but rather whether the cumulative work-related exertion
exceeds the normal level of exertion in nonemployment life. We doubt that
there are many physical activities outside of the work place where this type of
effort is being repeated so often over such a significant period of time.
Nyrehn at 336.
The majority decision of the Industrial Commission compared Ms. Warner's exertions
with examples of typical exertions of modern day life, as given in the Allen decision:
The lifting, carrying and standing that Ms. Warner did at Merit is not
different from the exertions involved in changing a flat tire, doing laundry,
moving garbage cans and recycling bins, lawn care, or caring for young
children, to mention just a few everyday examples. R. at 456-457.

The Commission concluded that when the full range of all non-employment activities
were considered, the frequency of her lifting was not unusual or extraordinary, and hence,
legal causation was not met.
This is again at odds with the Nyrehn decision:
The Commission's finding that Nyrehn's work-related exertion was not
an unusual exertion was comparable to a conclusion that the typical
nonemployment activities of people in today's society includes lifting a full
8

garbage can 30 to 36 times per day each working day for two and a half months.
Merely stating the comparison shows the fallacy of the Commission's finding.
Nyrehn's back injury was not a coincidental injury which appeared at work
without any enhancement from the work place. "[Her] employment contributed
something substantial to increase the risk [she] already faced in everyday life
because of [her] condition." Allen, 729 P.2d at 25. The Commission's
conclusion that Nyrehn failed to prove legal causation was therefore not
reasonable and rational.
Nyrehn at 336.
Lori Warner worked the same job at Merit Medical for over two months. She lifted
tubs or totes containing medical parts weighing from 5 to 26 pounds. As found by the
Commission, she did this about 9 times per hour, which amounts to 72 times per day. Merit's
witness Terry Price verified under oath that the 26 pounds was an average; some weigh more,
some less, but none weigh more than 40 pounds. R at 61.
Hence, in an 8 hour work day, Ms. Warner bent to lift a total of about 72 totes as she
carried them from the machines located throughout the 9,000 square foot room where the
operation was located, to a counter where she would lift them up to weigh them and then place
them down again on the floor for subsequent inspection by QA workers. R. at 428, 454. She
was continually busy during her shift. R. at 429.
This case involves substantially more lifting than was found in the Nyrehn case. The
Industrial Commission has made the same errors in its analysis and application of the law as it
did in the Nyrehn case. For the same reasons its conclusions are in error. This Court should
conclude, as it did in Nyrehn. that the applicant did prove legal causation.

9

POINT II
The Industrial Commission Improperly Disregarded the
Conclusions of the Medical Panel
Utah law provides for use of a medical panel, appointed by the Industrial Commission,
to which medical aspects of a case can be referred when significant medical issues are
involved. Generally, significant medical issues are involved when there are conflicting
medical reports on file in the case. Section 35-l-77(l)(a), U.C.A. (1994) and Utah Admin.
Code R568-1-9 (1996).
Section 37-l-77(2)(d) of the Utah Code states:
The commission may base its finding and decision on the report
of the panel, medical director, or medical consultants, but is not bound by the
report if other substantial conflicting evidence in the case supports a contrary
finding.
In this matter, the ALJ referred the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel
consisting of Drs. Madison Thomas and A. Owen Smoot, both orthopedic surgeons. Included
in the medical record that was considered by the panel were medical reports from Ms.
Warner's treating physician and a report from doctors previously retained by the insurance
carrier who, at the carrier's request, had examined Ms. Warner and her medical records, and
given an opinion. The report of Ms. Warner's doctor and that of the insurance company's
doctors differ on the conclusions about medical causation and provide the basis for the
"significant medical issue" that resulted in the referral by the Commission to the medical
panel.
Following the medical panel examination, the panel issued a report that was then
circulated to the parties by the Industrial Commission. The parties were allowed 15 days
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within which to submit objections to the medical panel report. No timely objections were
made.
As a result of the examination of the applicant, as well as of her records and x-rays, the
medical panel concluded that there is a "limited medically demonstrable causal connection
between the applicant's low back problems and the work exposure from January through
March of 1995." The panel noted the existence of pre-existing conditions in Ms. Warner's low
back.
The panel found that the June 5, 1995 low back surgery was necessitated "to a limited
extent" by the work exposure. It found that the medical care she received for her low back
since March 24, 1995 was necessitated by her work exposure, again to a "limited extent". The
panel stated in that regard that "other factors, such as embarrassment and apprehension
contributed to her situation." R. at 418.
In discussing the surgery, the panel noted, " It is quite possible that the surgery may not
have been needed at that time had there been more concern for the functional aspect of her
reactions to her total circumstances." However, they did not conclude that it was unneeded or
unrelated to the work activities in question. R. at 418.
Obviously, questions may be raised by the panel's use of "limited extent" in its answer
to some of the questions posed by the ALJ. The Industrial Commission, however, did not ask
the medical panel for clarification of what it meant by use of the phrase "limited extent".
Nevertheless, the panel assigned 1% out of a 5% whole body impairment relative to the lower
back for the industrial claim. That, in and of itself, is indicative of a limited relationship with
80% of the rating being pre-existing.
11

Two of the three Commissioners rejected the medical panel report in favor of adopting
the insurance company's report. This latter report noted, as did the medical panel, the preexisting conditions of fractured apophyseal rings and bulging lumbar disks. They also noted
that Ms. Warner's pain did not begin at work. This is not contested, as Ms. Warner testified
that she had the beginning of low back pain upon awakening one morning after a prior
evening's work. They noted there was no single event at work that was associated with the
pain. This is also not contested as this is exactly what the claim is about: back pain resulting
from cumulative trauma over the two to two and a half month period that Ms. Warner was
employed by Merit. However, it is evident from the report of these two doctors that there was
no consideration of the weight lifted by Ms. Warner. They commented that there was no
description of the work injury in any of the medical records they reviewed, and their report
does not mention any lifting over 5 lbs. R. at 400. This is in sharp contrast to the testimony
at the hearing and the resulting findings of the Commission that Ms. Warner was lifting tubs
that weighed 26 lbs.
The Commissioners stated that the insurance doctors' opinion is persuasive because "it
is supported by a thorough review of Ms. Warner's medical records, as well as physical
examination of Ms. Warner." R. at 458.
However, the medical panel also had the benefit of an examination of Ms. Warner, as
well as having her medical records and x-rays to examine. The panel also had the benefit of
the insurance doctor's report and also the summary of testimony provided by the ALJ
following an evidentiary hearing. The ALJ's findings discussed the weights involved, which
the insurance company's doctors did not do. The insurance company's report was prepared
12

before the hearing.
The whole purpose of a medical panel is to provide an impartial examination of the
worker and her medical records. Yet, here, the majority of the Commissioners rejected the
medical panel's report likely because of the use of the word "limited", without even obtaining
the benefit of a clarification from the panel as to what was meant by the use of that word.
Language contained in Commissioner Carlson's dissent to the Order on Motion for
Review is important here:
This case epitomizes what is so difficult in these cases. It is such a close
call that even the medical panel obviously struggled with the decision. And
because it is so close, one must recognize that even the most conscientious in the
medical community who are being hired by an insurance company (as is the case
here) easily and almost automatically arrive at decisions that do not favor the
claimant. That is precisely why the medical panel system is used. It is my
understanding that the medical panel concept was created to avoid the possibility
of representational bias as the panel is paid by the Commission through a
statutorily described method. Certainly, that is the logic behind its continued
use today. By rejecting the opinion of the Commission's own medical experts, I
believe the majority stretches beyond its capability and knowledge to adequately
judge this case and, in effect, ignores the fundamental purpose of the medical
panel in arriving at its conclusion.
R. at 459-460
Section 35-l-77(2)(d) of the Utah Code, as noted above, indicates that the Industrial
Commission is not bound by the medical panel's report "if other substantial conflicting
evidence in the case supports a contrary finding." (Emphasis added). This language indicates
that the discretion of the Industrial Commission is limited such that it may not reject the
findings of a medical panel unless there is other substantial conflicting evidence in the case, be
it medical evidence, or other factual evidence.
A common example of conflicting medical evidence that could overturn a medical panel
13

report is evidence that results from additional testing or from testimony given at a hearing on
medical panel objections that is significant and conflicts with the medical panel's conclusions.
Substantial conflicting nonmedical evidence to support a rejection or modification of a medical
panel report could be in the form of witness testimony or physical evidence that bears upon the
question of the occurrence of an industrial accident, or whether a worker was injured in the
manner claimed.
There is no substantial conflicting evidence sufficient to upset a medical panel report, to
which no objections have been filed, when there is nothing new added to the case medically or
otherwise that has not already been considered. Here, the medical panel had the opportunity to
review and consider the report of the insurance company's doctors. After reviewing all
opinions and records, the panel concluded that the cumulative trauma at work was causally
related, even if by a slim margin, to the low back problems.
Consider the problems that would be created by a policy that allowed a medical panel's
report to be simply disregarded by the Industrial Commission, without even a hearing, in favor
of a report of an insurance company doctor, or even an applicant's doctor, that was at odds
with the medical panel, but that was considered by the panel in its deliberations. The value of
a medical panel in our workers' compensation system would be minimized if not destroyed.
The constitutionality of such a policy would be in serious question as well.
Certainly this may be a close case, but the Commission erred in overturning the
decision of the ALJ by simply rejecting the medical panel report with no other evidence than
what had otherwise been presented. There was no other significant conflicting evidence in this
case upon which such an action could justifiably be based.
14

CONCLUSION
Ms. Warner has met her burden of establishing legal causation under the higher
standard required by the Allen decision. The Industrial Commission did not properly apply the
Allen decision to the facts of this case.
She has also met her burden of establishing medical causation based upon the report of
the medical panel. The order of the Industrial Commission should be reversed because of its
improper interpretation and application of the law and the initial award of the ALJ be
reinstated.
Dated this§2-day of October , 1A SOQI
S I

•MlliD

Day Shell & Liljenquist, L.C.
Attorneys for Petitioner Lori Warner
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ADDENDUM
1.

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, dated September 13, 1996

2.

Order Granting Motion for Review, dated March 17, 1997

3.

Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, dated May 2, 1997
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No, 95555

LORI WARNER,
Applicant,

*
*
*
*

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
MERIT MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC./
TIG INSURANCE,

*
*
*

AND ORDER

if

Defendants.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*
*
*

HEARING:

Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah,
160 East 3 00 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on
February 6, 1996 at 10:00 o'clock a.m.
Said
hearing was pursuant to Order and Notice of the
Commission.

BEFORE:

Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was represented by Phillip Shell,
Attorney.
The defendants were represented by Theodore Kanell,
Attorney.

This case involves a claim for temporary total compensation
(TTC), medical expenses and permanent impairment benefits related
to low back injury caused by cummulative trauma on the job. The
defendants deny all liabiity in this case, based primarily on the
lack of a medical causal connection between the applicant's work
exposure and the back problems that she began having on March 24,
1995.
The defendants also assert that any back injury she
sustained is non-compensable, as she had a contributory preexisting condition and was not injured as a result of any unusual
exertion (as required for compensability, per the ruling in Allen
v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986)). The applicant
relies on the opinion of her treating physician, Dr. J. L. Smith,
to support her contention that her back problems and need for
surgery are related to repetitive bending, twisting and lifting in
her job with Merit Medical Systems, Inc. She claims TTC from March
24, 1995 through September 21, 1995 (she returned to work on
September 22, 1995), medical expenses and permanent impairment
benefits (she has been rated by her own treating physician, Dr. J.
L. Smith at 5% whole person and by the defendants' chosen

ORDER
RE: LORI WARNER
PAGE 2

physician, Dr. G. Moress, at 10% whole person). The defendants
rely on the opinion of their chosen physician, Dr. G. Moress, to
support their contention that there is no medical causal connection
between the applicant's back problems and her work at Merit Medical
Systems, Inc.
Because of the divergent medical opinions regarding the
causal connection between the applicant's injury/condition and her
work at Merit Medical, the ALJ determined that the matter should be
referred to a medical panel for additional input on the causal
controversy. The matter was referred to the medical panel on May
14, 1996. The medical panel report was received at the Commission
on July 11, 1996, and was distributed to the parties on that same
date, with 15 days allowed for the filing of objections. On July
25, 1996, the ALJ received comments from the applicant. On August
16, 1996, the ALJ received comments/argument from the defendants.
The matter was considered ready for order as of July 26, 1996.
EVIDENCE PRESENTED:
The applicant is a female who was 35 years old on March 24,
1995, with no spouse nor minor children. She was employed with
Merit Medical Systems, Inc. at that time, as a molding operator,
working 40 hours per week, earning a wage of $7.30/hour. The
applicant began performing this job in January of 1995 and she
worked swing shift, from 2:00 PM to 10:00 PM. The applicants job
consisted of servicing a number of large machines that manufactured
plastic medical parts, such as syringe barrels, angioplasty barrels
and "cock manifolds." The machines were quite large, measuring
over 5 feet tall and over 10 feet long. A drawing of one of the
machines was submitted at hearing and was marked as Exhibit A-l.
A video was also shown at hearing in which several of the machines
are seen. The applicant has argued that the drawing and the video
do not show the full range of machines that she serviced and that
some of the machines were quite different than the ones seen on the
video. The defendants apparently feel that any difference in the
machines serviced by the applicant is irrelevant to the nature of
the applicant's work duties.
One of the applicant's main responsibilities was to empty
a plastic tote that was positioned on the machine* to catch the
completed parts as the machine produced them. Apparently, the size
of the totes is not in dispute. The applicant described the totes
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as being 2% feet by 1% feet by 1% feet and she estimated that they
weighed 5 pounds when empty. The weight of the totes when they
were to be emptied and the number of totes that the applicant
handled in an average shift are very much in dispute.
The applicant estimated that the totes weighed anywhere from
5 pounds to 35 pounds when she emptied them, with the average tote
weighing around 25 pounds. Rex Teitgen, the molding manager at the
time that the applicant was working for Merit Medical, testified
that the heaviest tote, per a read-out of the scales where the
totes were weighed, was 26 pounds. Therefore, it is the defendants
position that the average tote weighed considerably less than 25
pounds.
There was quite a bit of confusion regarding in the
testimony regarding how many totes needed to be emptied per hour.
The number of totes to be handled was dependent upon a number of
variables. First, this depended on how many machines a worker was
handling at any given time. The machines were located in a very
large room and there were 5 to 8 workers working together in the
room at one time. Apparently, most workers were responsible for
just 3 machines at a time. However, when a worker needed to go on
break or lunch, the other workers filled in and took care of the
machines assigned to the absent worker.
The defendants
acknowledged that this occurred, but it is unclear if the defense
witnesses took this into consideration in estimating how often a
worker would be emptying a tote. The applicant estimated that she
emptied 3 totes per hour off each machine for which she was
responsible (at least 9 totes total per hour). However, she stated
that this was when the machines were set to produce at a maximum
rate, which was not all the time.
Rex Teitgen, the molding
manager, estimated that a worker would be emptying just 4 totes per
hour total.
Per the video, the totes were emptied by sliding the tote
out from the machine and walking several feet over to a table where
the contents of the tote were either poured into a plastic bag (if
the parts were quite small) or were lifted out by the handful and
placed into another larger tote (if the parts were somewhat
larger). Although Rex Teitgen testified that all the totes were
located in the same place on all the machines (waist height or just
below), the applicant testified that on some of the machines, the
tote was located on the floor, requiring the worker to bend over to
pick up the tote so it could be emptied. The applicant stated that
the machines that had the totes on the floor manufactured the
larger heavier parts. In addition, the applicant stated that she
would get an electrical shock from some of the machines as she
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emptied the totes, if any part of her body touched the machine as
she did so. In order to avoid this shock, the applicant stated
that she would stand as far away from the machine as she could and
then would lean and reach over to pull the tote out. Rex Teitgen
testified that no one ever reported to him that they were shocked
by any of the machines.
In addition to emptying the totes on the machines, the
workers were required to periodically take a tote or bag of
completed parts over to a table where the parts were weighed by the
worker and measured. Once again, there was considerable disparity
between the testimony of the applicant and the defense witnesses on
what was required for this task.
The applicant referred to
carrying the totes across the large room to a weighing table. Then
she stated she needed to lift the tote full of parts to head height
in order to get it on the scale. She stated that she then lifted
the tote off the scale and carried it over to the quality assurance
(QA) inspectors. About once per hour, the applicant stated she
also had to spend some time standing at a table checking dimensions
on the manunfactured parts. She used calipers and pin gauges to do
this. She stated that she was allowed to sit or stand, but felt
that the supervisors preferred the workers to stand so they could
quickly get back to service a machine, if necessary. The applicant
estimated that the measuring took about 20 minutes, during which
the machines would continue to produce parts. The applicant stated
tha the machine totes could get quite full while she was away doing
the measuring and this resulted in heavier totes. Rex Teitgen, the
molding manager, stated that he felt the measuring would take only
10-12 minutes, but admitted that this was based on all workers
being present without consideration of need to fill in for a worker
on lunch or breaks.
The video shows that the large totes into which the parts
were dumped were located on wheeled carts. Rex Teitgen stated that
there was no need to carry these totes over to the scale. He
indicated that they could be wheeled over to the scale on the cart.
However, the applicant stated that the video shows the current setup at Merit Medical and that this set-up is not the same as it was
when she worked there. She stated that initially there were no
wheeled carts on which to move the totes and they had to be carried
over to the scale. In addition, she stated that when the carts
were obtained, there was not a cart assigned to each machine and
therefore a cart was not always available for transporting the
larger totes to the scale. Teitgen testified that he felt that
even though there was only 3 wheeled carts during early 1995, that
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a cart would always be available for the workers to transport the
totes. He stated that he never personally saw a worker carrying a
tote over to the scale, but he could not say that it never
happened.

The applicant testified that she needed to move quickly and
continually in order to service 3 machines and that there was no
time when she was just standing or sitting.
In addition to
servicing the machines, the applicant stated that she periodically
needed to vacuum the floors at the end of the shift to pick up any
fallen parts. The applicant also testified that she felt the video
was not necessarily representative of her work duties, for the
reasons already noted, and because she stated that the video showed
the day shift, whereas she worked swing shift. Unfortunately, it
was not clear to the ALJ what specifically was different about the
two shifts.
On March 23, 1995, the applicant was working her normal
shift, but went home early that day. She left early due to a
headache that was related to a dental problem.
The applicant
testified that the next morning, on March 24, 1995, she awoke with
low back pain radiating to her right buttocks and down past her
knee. The applicant stated that she had difficulty walking at that
time, as well.
She stated that she could not recall anything
unusual about her work duties in the weeks just preceding March 24,
1995. The applicant went to the Holladay Instacare on March 24,
1995 with complaints of back pain and pain walking noted at the
clinic.
The record for that visit is handwritten and very
illegible.
The applicant testified that she was given a
prescription for muscle relaxants. She rested the rest of that day
and the next and was scheduled to work March 26, 1995. She stated
she called in to work on that day and indicated that she would not
be there due to problems she was having walking.
The follow-up she got after going to Instacare is somewhat
unclear. The medical record exhibit, Exhibit D-l, does not show
any follow-up at Instacare. There is a March 28, 1995 report of a
CT scan of the lumbar spine, with the referring physician being Dr.
Clark Newhall. It is unclear how the applicant got referred for
this scan and what involvement Dr. Newhall had in the applicants
care. The CT scan was read as follows:
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1.

Degenerative disc changes L5-S1 with Grade
I-II central disc bulge and associated
irregular
calcification
possibly
representing old ring apophyseal avulsion.
No significant neural element compromise.

2.

Grade I diffuse bulge L4-5 with associated
suspected small Grade I-II superiorly
extruded herniated fragment. There is also
irregularity of the posterior ring apophysis
suggesting old trauma to this apophysis as
well.

3.

Otherwise unremarkable
spine.

CT of the lumbar

The applicant testified that Cottonwood Hospital referred
her to Dr. J. L. Smith. Dr. Smith saw the applicant for the first
time on April 7, 1995 and he noted that she had injured her back on
March 24, 1995 and had pain and difficulty in the buttocks since
that time. He read X-rays to show degeneration at L5-S1 (grade III) and some at L4-5 with a possible extruded fragment.
He
prescribed anti-inflammatories and exercise and noted that if the
applicant did not improve he "might have to go after the extruded
fragment." When Dr. Smith saw the applicant again on April 13,
1995, he noted that the applicant was worse and that an attempt to
return to work was unsuccessful. He took the applicant off work,
referred her for physical therapy and noted that he planned to
schedule surgery, if she was still symptomatic by May 2, 1995.
The applicant was seen at Southwest Emergency on April 14,
1995 with complaints of back pain that had begun on March 24, 1995.
It was noted that the pain was in the low back and hips, with the
right buttocks pain resolved.
No numbness or tingling was
reported.
The report notes that the applicant originally had
thought that her symptoms were flu related. Also noted was the
fact that her job involved alot of bending, but not lifting of more
than 20 pounds. An acute lumbar strain was diagnosed and the
applicant was referred back to Dr. Smith for follow-up.
The
attending physician noted that he was .not sure if her problem was
work related. When Dr. Smith saw her again on May 2, 1995, he
noted that the applicant was no better and that physical therapy
had not helped. He noted that the applicant had low back pain
radiating down her leg that she was unable stand anymore. He noted
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that he informed the applicant that surgery offered a 50-70% chance
of helping her. It was decided that he would go forward with a
discectomy.
The applicant was at Cottonwood Hospital from June 5, 1995
through June 7, 1995 for the surgery. The records for the visit
and surgery are somewhat confusing.
The history and physical
examination report notes that the applicant had a history of right
leg pain only for 3 months. The diagnosis is listed as herniated
disc at L4-5 and encroachment on L5-S1. Although the procedure on
the operative report is listed as: discectomy L4-5 and right
exploration L5-S1, the actual report suggests that an L5-S1
discectomy was the only procedure performed. After the surgery,
the applicant followed-up with Dr. Smith. The applicant stated
that the surgery did help in that she was able to walk afterwards
and could not prior to the surgery. However, she stated that she
still had low back pain and buttocks pain, as of the date of the
hearing, and she stated she was still taking medication and seeing
Dr. Smith, as of that time.
Dr. Smith completed a Summary of Medical Record form dated
June 22, 1995. On that form he notes an affirmative answer to the
question regarding a causal connection between the work injury and
the treatment offered (the reference to a March 24, 1992 is
apparently a mistake).
He notes future treatment as physical
therapy and the permanent impairment rating as unknown. Dr. Smith
also wrote a letter to-whom-it-may-concern dated August 10, 1995.
In that letter, Dr. Smith notes an August 1986 slip in the shower,
but notes that the applicant had no back pain after that until
March 24, 1995. The one record with respect to the 1986 shower
incident is an FHP urgent care visit note. It indicates that the
applicant slipped in the shower and tried to catch herself, but did
not fall. It notes extreme low back pain, with an injection and
prescription medication offered as treatment. The applicant stated
that this resolved in one or two days. Dr. Smith's August 10, 1995
letter goes on to note that the applicant told him that her pain
was brought on by her work, where she did repetitive lifting and
bending type motions. In this letter, Dr. Smith notes that the
applicant had an extruded fragment at L4-5, for which he did a
discectomy and exploration of L5-S1. In a letter dated January 4,
1996, Dr. Smith notes that the applicant had reached maximum
medical improvement and had a 5% whole person rating.
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The applicant was seen by Dr. G. Moress and Dr. W. Hess on
January 22, 1996 at the request of the defendants. The report for
that examination notes that the applicant complained of pain of
6/10 at the time of the visit, the same level as pre-surgery.
Buttocks aching and leg tingling were also noted as complaints.
The report states that the doctors read the CT scan to show a small
disc bulge at L4-5 and possibly one at L5-S1, without any
compromise of the neural structures.
The fracture of the
apophyseal ring seen on the CT was developmental in origin per Dr.
Moress and Dr. Hess. Dr. Moress and Hess note that it was unclear
to them which level of the applicant's spine Dr. Smith operated on
and what exactly he did in the operation. Dr. Moress and Hess
include in their diagnostic impression a diagnosis of pain disorder
characterized by psychological factors. The doctors note that the
applicant's examination was replete with inappropriate credibility
tests.
Because the applicant's pain began away from the work
place, the doctors conclude that it was difficult to assign the
applicant's work as the cause of her back injury/condition. The
doctors rated the applicant at 10% whole person, all of which they
found to be unrelated to the applicant's work.
PRELIMINARY FACT CONCLUSIONS:
With respect to factual conclusions regarding the specifics
of the applicant's work duties, the ALJ will need to simply offer
ranges in the weights and number of repetitions involved. The
testimony was rather divergent and there were no obvious
credibility problems, so that the ALJ must conclude that the two
witnesses (the applicant and Teitgen) just honestly estimate
differently. With respect to the average weight of the totes, the
ALJ finds that they weighed anywhere from 5-2 0 pounds generally,
with some occasionally weighing up to 26 pounds. The applicant
herself apparently told the Southwest Emergency personnel that she
did not lift in excess of 2 0 pounds and thus the ALJ finds the
applicant's hearing testimony of an average of 25 pounds to be
somewhat of a high estimate. With respect to the number of times
the applicant had to empty a machine tote, the ALJ accepts the
applicant's testimony of at least 9 times per hour, as the ALJ
believes that Teitgen's testimony did not account for times when
the applicant may have been operating more than just her 3 assigned
machines. The ALJ also accepts the applicant's testimony that she
did carry totes to the scale, rather than pushing them on a cart,
as the carts were either totally unavailable or only occasionally
available for her use. The ALJ finds that the video gives only a
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very general idea of the applicant's work site and work duties, and
should not be accepted as an exact representation of the work the
applicant performed.
THE MEDICAL PANEL REPORT:
In addition to her back symptoms, the panel report notes
that the applicant currently has irritable bowel syndrome and
currently takes medication (doxepin) for stress management. The
panel notes that the applicant feels that she has emotional
problems. The panel notes that the applicant's pain diagram shows
symptoms in all 4 limbs and over most of the spine/back. The panel
also notes that the applicant acknowledged a long history of
depression (with past treatment). With respect to the back, the
panel noted that the applicant did have prior X-ray evidence of
"changes." Even so, the panel concluded that there was a "limited"
medical causal connection between the applicant's low back problems
and her work exposure from January 1995 through March 1995. The
panel specified this limited connection to be a work aggravation of
her prior impaired condition, occurring in a "setting of
psychologic overlay."
However, the panel found that the
applicant's gastro-intestinal problems and her depressive symptoms
were long-standing and were not caused by her work exposure. Low
back treatment after March 24, 1995 was found to be necessitated by
the work exposure, including the June 5, 1995 surgery.
With
respect to the surgery, the panel did comment as follows:
It is quite possible that the surgery may not have
been needed at that time had there been more
concern for the functional aspect of her reaction
to her total circumstances.
The panel rated the applicant's low back condition at 5% whole
person, attributing 1% whole person to the applicant's early 1995
work exposure and 4% whole person to pre-existing conditions. The
panel also found that the applicant medically stabilized about 3
months after the June 5, 1995 surgery.
OBJECTIONS/COMMENTS FROM THE PARTIES:
The comments filed by the applicant include a hand-written
letter noting a list of additional facts, and some correction of
panel facts, mostly in reference to symptoms, activity and work
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dating after the applicant's work exposure at Merit Medical. The
list also includes some refinements on the testing and symptoms
that occurred at the time that the applicant was seen at Southwest
Emergency. There is no argument submitted with this listing, and
in fact, the applicant's attorney included a cover letter with the
listing, noting that the applicant understood that her comments did
not necessarily raise any medical or legal issue sufficient to
controvert the panel's report.
The comments filed by the defendants note that the
defendants did not file objections to the medical panel report,
because the report seemed to indicate that Merit Medical should not
be responsible for payment of the surgery. The comments also note
that the defendants object to any claim for bladder problems. With
respect to the overall panel report, the defendants make an unclear
argument that there "may be a serious question as to the viability
of the medical panel report" and an insufficient "level of degree
of medical certainty" on the medical causal conclusion, due to the
applicant's "attacks upon the medical panel report." In closing,
the defendants note that they were reasserting the legal causation
argument (i.e. no unusual exertion) earilier made.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
Medical Cause:
The ALJ adopts the medical panel report to resolve the
medical causal issues in this case. The ALJ does so because the
panel report is the most soundly based medical opinion that clearly
addresses all the medical questions relevant to the applicant's
entitlement to benefits. In addition, the ALJ finds that there
have been no real objections to the panel findings and conclusions.
The defendants make an effort at stating some objection to the
panel findings on causation, but their argument in this regard is
difficult for the ALJ to understand and appears to relate back to
the applicant's comments, which are not really objections either.
As the ALJ can find no clearly explained objections to the panel's
conclusions, the ALJ finds that there are no real objections to the
report. As such, the ALJ adopts the panel findings.
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Although the panel commented on the interplay between the
applicant's "functional" or psychological concerns and her back
injury, the panel did not go so far as to make any conclusions that
the applicant's back problems were solely functional. Instead, the
panel clearly states that it found the back treatment necessitated
by the applicant's work exposure at Merit Medical in early 1995.
In conjunction with this, and consistent with this, the panel
specifically found that the back surgery was necessitated by the
work exposure. The panel stated this in very clear terms on page
seven of the report, under item number eight. Therefore, the ALJ
does not understand how the defendants read the report to indicate
otherwise. The panel did merely comment that, had the fucntional
concerns been investigated more closely, it may have been
determined that the surgery was unnecessary. However, the panel is
clear in their conclusion regarding the medical causal connection
between the work exposure and the surgery and makes the above-noted
comment only as a suggestion as to a different result that could
have happened, but did not.
Based on the above-explained interpretation of the medical
panel report and the above-explained reasons for adopting that
report, the ALJ adopts the panel conclusion that the applicant's
work exposure at Merit Medical medically caused her subsequent back
treatment and surgery. Consistently, the ALJ also adopts the panel
finding that the applicant has a 1% whole person permanent
impairment to her low back as a result of the work exposure.
Legal Cause:
In adopting the medical panel conclusions, the ALJ also
adopts the panel conclusion that the applicant had a contributory
pre-existing low back impairment (rated at 4% whole person). As a
result, per the Allen case cited at that beginning of this order,
in order for the applicant's back injury to be compensable, the
injury must have occurred as a result of exertion greater than what
is experienced away from work by the average late-20th century
individual.
Although the ALJ finds the ruling in Allen quite
logical and certainly preferable to the jumble of conflicting
opinions that existed prior to its issuance, the ALJ still has
considerable difficulty in applying the "unusual exertion" standard
to certain facts, especially in cases such as this, where there is
no obvious unusual strain (like lifting 100 pounds or doing
something rapidly over and over many times) . Depending on who you
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pick to be the "average" person, the applicants lifting/carrying
of 5 to 2 0 pounds, 9 times per hour, may be more exertive or less
exertive than the average person's non-employment activities.
However, the ALJ finds that some consideration must be given to how
the lifting/carrying occurred.
In this case, the ALJ found that the applicant stood far
away from the machines, and reached over with her arms
outstretched, to remove the totes from the machines. The ALJ found
that she did this in order to avoid a potential electrical shock
that she felt might occur if she stood too closely to the machine.
Regardless of whether or not these electrical shocks were reality,
the applicant testified, and the ALJ accepted, that she had great
concern regarding this potential shocking. The exaggerated posture
would seem to the ALJ to cause her activity to be more strenuous
then had she stood close to the machine, and lifted the totes or
bins keeping them close to her body, as she did so. Taking this
into consideration, and without any real guidelines to use in
determining what "average" people do in their non-employment lives,
the ALJ concludes that the lifting of the 5-20 pound totes in this
exaggerated manner, nine times per hour, is slightly more exertive
than what the average person does in their everyday non-employment
lives.
As such, the ALJ concludes that legal causation is
established.

BENEFITS DUE:
Medical and legal causation established, the ALJ finds that
the applicant sustained a compensable industrial injury as a result
of her work activities at Merit Medical in early 1995.
The
applicant7s compensation rate is figured as follows: $7.3 0/hour x
40 hours/week = $292.00/week x .667 = $194.76 or $195.00/week, when
rounded off as required by U.C.A. 35-1-75.
Based on the
conclusions of the medical panel, the applicant is due temporary
total compensation (TTC) for the period of medical instability,
apparently from March 24, 1995 through September 5, 1995 (3 months
after the June 5, 1995 surgery). That period is 23 weeks and 5
days, or 23.714 weeks. The TTC award is thus $195.00/week x 23.714
weeks, or a total of $4,624.23. Permanent impairment benefits are
based on the 1% whole person rating offered by the panel. This
would entitle the applicant to an additional 3.12 weeks (312 weeks
for the whole person x .01) of benefits or $608.40 ($195.00/week x
3.12 weeks).
The applicant's total award is thus $5,232.63
($4,624.23 TTC + $608.40 PPI). Attorney fees, per R568-1-7, are
$1,046.53 ($5,232.63 x .20).
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ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendants, Merit Medical
Systems, Inc./TIG Insurance, pay the applicant, Lori Warner,
temporary total compensation, at the rate of $195.00 per week, for
23.714 weeks, or a total of $4,624.23, for the period of medical
instability related to the early 1995 back injury, from March 24,
1995 to September 5, 1995.
That amount is accrued and due and
payable in a lump sum, plus interest at 8% per annum, per U.C.A.
35-1-78, and less the attorney fees to be awarded below.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Merit Medical
Systems, Inc./TIG Insurance, pay all medical expenses incurred as
the result of the early 1995 back injury, as outlined in the order
above; said expenses to be paid in accordance with the medical and
surgical fee schedule of the Industrial Commission of Utah.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Merit Medical
Systems, Inc./TIG Insurance, pay the applicant, Lori Warner,
permanent impairment benefits, at the rate of $195.00 per week, for
3.12 weeks, or a total of $608.40, for the 1% whole person
permanent impairment resulting from the early 1995 back injury.
That amount is accrued and due and payable in a lump sum, plus
interest at 8% per annum, per U.C.A. 35-1-78.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Merit Medical
Systems, Inc./TIG Insurance, pay Phillip Shell, attorney for the
applicant, the sum of $1,04 6.53, plus 2 0.% of the interest on the
award, per R568-1-7, for services rendered in this matter, the same
to be deducted from the aforesaid award to the applicant, and to be
remitted directly to the office of Phillip Shell.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be received in the offices of the Commission within
thirty (30) days of the date hereof, specifying in detail the
particular errors and objections, and, unless received by the
Commission within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, this Order
shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. If a Motion
for Review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days of
the date hereof, any response of the opposing party shall be filed
within fifteen (15) days of the date of the receipt of the Motion
for Review by the Commission in accordance with U.C.A. Section 6346b-12.

DATED this 13th day of September, 1996.

Barbara Elicerio
Administrative Law Judge
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Merit Medical Systems, Inc. and its workers' compensation
insurance carrier, TIG Insurance Company (referred to jointly as
"Merit" hereafter), ask The Industrial Commission of Utah to review
the Administrative Law Judge's award of benefits to Lori Warner
under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
The Industrial Commission exercises jurisdiction over this
motion for review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code
Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M.
ISSUE PRESENTED
Was Ms. Warner's work at Merit both the legal cause and the
medical cause of the injury for which she now seeks workers'
compensation benefits?
FINDINGS OF FACT
Ms. Warner seeks temporary total disability compensation,
permanent partial disability compensation and medical expenses for
a back injury allegedly caused by her work at Merit. Specifically,
she contends that cumulative trauma from her work resulted in pain
beginning March 24, 1995, which necessitated surgery in June 1995
to remove the disc at the L5-S1 level of her spine.
Ms. Warner began employment at Merit during January 1995, as
a molding operator. She worked the swing shift five days a week,
8 hours a day, servicing machines that produced plastic parts for
medical devices. As the machines produced the parts, they fell
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into bins with dimensions of 35" x 18" x 18". Ms. Warner would
remove the bins from the machines and carry them several feet to a
table where she emptied the bins into larger containers.
On average, Ms. Warner emptied 9 bins an hour.
On some
machines the bins were at waist level, while on other machines the
bins were on the floor. The bins weighed between 5 and 26 pounds
depending on how much product they contained. The heavier hoppers
tended to be at floor level. Because she was afraid of receiving
electrical shocks from the machines, Ms. Warner stood as far as
possible from them, which required her to lean over to pull the
bins from the machines.
Also as part of her duties, Ms. Warner periodically carried a
bin across the manufacturing room to a set of scales that were at
the height of her head. Additionally, she periodically checked the
dimensions of various parts by placing them on a table and
measuring them with calibers and gauges. She also vacuumed and
cleaned around her machines.
Ms. Warner has not identified any unusual work activity or any
pain related to her work prior to March 24, 1995. On March 23,
1995, she left work early with a headache caused by dental
problems. The next morning, she awoke with back pain and found it
difficult to walk. She sought medical attention at an Instacare
clinic and was given a prescription for a muscle relaxant. She did
not report to work as scheduled on March 25, 1995 due to her back
pain. Then, on March 28, 1995, she underwent a CT scan and was
diagnosed with 1) degenerative disc changes at the L5-S1 level of
her spine; 2) a bulging disc with possible herniated fragments at
the L4-5 level; and 3) evidence of old trauma at both sites.
On April 7, 1995, Ms. Warner was examined by Dr. Smith and
again diagnosed with degeneration at the L5-S1 and L4-5 levels,
with possible extruded fragments.
Dr.
Smith prescribed
conservative treatment, but after such conservative therapy failed
to alleviate Ms. Warner's pain, he performed a discectomy at the
L5-S1 level.
After surgery, Ms. Warner experienced some relief from her
back pain.
Her recovery was uneventful and she was placed on
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physical therapy for several months. She returned to work for a
time, but eventually stopped work due to continuing back pain.
Dr. Smith has expressed a very brief, conclusionary opinion
that Ms. Warner's work at Merit was a cause of her back pain and
ensuing surgery.
Merit then employed Dr. Moress, a neurologist,
and Dr. Hess, an orthopedist, to examine Ms. Warner and review her
medical records. Based on this evaluation, the doctors noted that
Ms. Warner's back pain did not occur at work and that she could not
recall any specific work event that might have triggered the pain.
They concluded that she suffered from "fractured apophyseal rings"
at the L4-5 and L5-S1 levels with associated bulging discs, but
that such conditions were developmental in nature and not related
to her work at Merit.
In light of the difference of opinion between Dr. Smith on one
hand and Dr. Hess and Dr. Moress on the other, the ALJ appointed a
medical panel consisting of Dr. Smoot, an orthopedist,
and Dr.
Thomas, a neurologist, to evaluate the medical aspects of Ms.
Warner's claim.
The panel examined Ms. Warner and reviewed her
medical records, then submitted a report finding
a "limited"
causal connection between her work and her back problems.
The
panel did not explain what it meant by a "limited" causal
connection, but did point out that Ms. Warner's x-rays showed
preexisting back problems resulting from "old changes".
The
medical panel concluded that Ms. Warner had a 5% whole person
impairment due to her low back problems, but that only 1% was
attributable to her work at Merit.
The panel attributed the
remaining 4% impairment to her pre-existing problems. Finally, the
panel concluded that Ms. Warner's medical care and surgery
was
necessary to care for her work related injury "to a limited
extent." The medical panel commented:
It is quite possible that the surgery may not have been
needed at that time had there been more concern for the
functional
aspect of her reaction to her total
circumstances.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act requires employers and
their workers' compensation
insurance
carriers
to provide
disability compensation and medical care to employees injured by
accidents "arising out of and in the course of their employment."
In order to qualify for such benefits, an injured worker must
establish by a preponderance of evidence that 1) the employee's
work is the legal cause of the injury for which benefits are
sought; and 2) the employee's work is the medical cause of the
injury. Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986).
Because Merit contends that Ms. Warner's work at Merit was
neither the legal cause nor the medical cause of her injuries, the
Industrial Commission will consider both issues.
I.

LEGAL CAUSATION:

In order to obtain benefits under Utah's Workers' Compensation
Act,
a worker with a preexisting medical condition must prove
that his or her work is the legal cause of the injury for which
benefits are claimed. This requirement of legal causation is met
when the worker shows an unusual or extraordinary exertion at work
that exceeds the exertions experienced by a typical individual in
everyday nonemployment life. Allen at 25.
The evidence in this case establishes that Ms. Warner suffers
from a preexisting low back condition related to the injury for
which she now seeks workers' compensation benefits.
She must,
therefore, show some unusual or extraordinary exertion arising from
her work at Merit.
In other words, she must prove that her
employment contributed something substantial to increase the risk
she already faced because of her preexisting condition.
The Industrial Commission has carefully considered the demands
of Ms. Warner's work at Merit, as well as the manner in which Ms.
Warner performed those duties, and concludes that her work
exertions were not unusual or extraordinary when compared to the
typical exertions of modern day life. The lifting, carrying and
standing that Ms. Warner did at Merit is not different from the
exertions
involved
in changing a flat tire, doing
laundry,
moving garbage cans and recycling bins, lawn care, or caring for
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young children, to mention just a few everyday activities.
The
Industrial Commission recognizes that Ms. Warner's work required
her to carry as many as 9 bins an hour, but the bins were not heavy
and usually were not carried very far. When the full range of all
non-employment activities are considered, even the frequency of Ms.
Warner's lifting and carrying at work is not unusual or
extraordinary. The Industrial Commission therefore finds that Ms.
Warner's work at Merit is not the legal cause of her injury.
II.

MEDICAL CAUSATION:

In order to establish medical causation, an injured worker
must establish a medically demonstrable causal link between the
stress, strain or exertion of the worker's employment and the
worker's injuries. Allen at 27. In considering whether Ms. Warner
has established such a link between her work at Merit and her
injuries, the Industrial Commission looks primarily to the opinions
of the medical experts who are familiar with Ms. Warner's medical
history and her current complaints.
Dr. Smith, who performed surgery on Ms. Warner's back, has
reported that her back injury is work related.
In making this
assessment,
Dr.
Smith
apparently
relies
on Ms. Warner's
representation to him that her back pain was "brought on" by her
work. This statement is contrary to the fact that Ms. Warner did
not experience back pain at work, but rather, began to suffer back
pain when she awoke in the morning, after she had been away from
work for most of a day.
Dr. Moress and Dr. Hess, the specialists who examined Ms.
Warner on behalf of Merit, have stated their unequivocal opinion
that Ms. Warner's current low back problems are not caused by her
work, but are entirely the result of preexisting conditions. This
opinion is persuasive because it is supported by a thorough review
of Ms. Warner's medical records, as well as physical examination of
Ms. Warner.
The doctors' opinion also appears consistent with
circumstances surrounding the onset of Ms. Warner's low back
problems during March 1995.
The final opinion regarding medical causation is that of the
medical panel appointed by the ALJ.
As did Dr. Moress and Dr.
Hess, the medical panel thoroughly reviewed Ms. Warner's medical
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records and examined Ms. Warner. However, on the issue of medical
causation, the panel was unusually equivocal when it concluded
there was "a limited
medically demonstrable causal connection"
between Ms. Warner's work and her low back pain. The panel did not
explain what it meant by a "limited" causal connection, but the
panel specifically noted that Ms. Warner's x-rays showed preexisting injuries. On the question of whether Ms. Warner's surgery
had been necessary to treat a work related injury, the medical
panel was even more ambiguous.
In considering the probative value of the three medical
opinions cited above, the Industrial Commission gives least weight
to Dr. Smith's statements because they lack detail and foundation.
The Industrial Commission finds the medical panel's report somewhat
unpersuasive because of its ambiguous and equivocating answers. In
contrast, the report of Dr. Moress and Dr. Hess is well reasoned
and consistent with the circumstances under which Ms. Warner began
to experience low back pain. The Industrial Commission therefore
accepts the opinion of Dr. Moress and Dr. Hess that there is no
medical causal connection between Ms. Warner's work at Merit and
her low back injury.
ORDER
The Industrial Commission concludes that Ms. Warner has failed
to establish that her work at Merit is the legal and medical cause
of the low back injury for which she seeks workers' compensation
benefits. The Industrial Commission therefore grants Merit's
motion for review, sets aside the ALJ's order, and dismisses Ms.
Warner's application for benefits. It is so ordered.
Dated this

/TZTday of

March , 1997.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR REVIEW
LORI WARNER
PAGE 7
DISSENT:
The Commission, through its Administrative Law Judges,
utilizes medical panels on a continuing basis.
The Commission
routinely remands those cases decided by ALJ's without the use of
medical panels if the Commission finds that medical issues,
opinions, or expenses need to be resolved by a medical panel as
delineated in administrative rule R568-1-9.
This instant case
involves the use of a medical panel to assist the Commission in
resolving the differing medical opinions raised by the treating
physician and reviewing medical doctors paid by the insurance
company.
The majority doesn't accept the response from the medical
panel report wherein it states "There is a limited medically
demonstrable causal connection...."
(page 6 ) . My colleagues have
decided that the medical panel's conclusion was "unusually
equivocal" through the panel's use of the word "limited".
The
majority also gives little weight to the treating physician's
opinion
that
there
is
a
"medically
demonstrative
causal
relationship between the industrial accident and the problems [he
has] been treating".
The majority apparently feels that the
treating physician merely automatically accepted what Ms. Warner
told him regarding the pain and its source and, therefore, his
response in "To Whom It May Concern" and in the Summary of Medical
Record (form 113) simply restates his lack of knowledge, even
though
he
surely
had
the most
fundamental
and
intimate
understanding of the claimant's problem as he was also the surgeon
as well as the treating physician.
This case epitomizes what is so difficult in these issues. It
is such a close call that even the medical panel obviously
struggled with the decision. And because it is so close, one must
recognize that even though the most conscientious in the medical
community who are being hired by an insurance company (as is the
case here) easily and almost automatically arrive at decisions that
do not favor the claimant. That is precisely why the medical panel
system is used.
It is my understanding that the medical panel
concept was created to avoid the possibility of representational
bias as the panel is paid by the Commission through a statutorily
described method.
Certainly, that is the logic behind its
continued useage today.
By rejecting the opinion of the
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Commission's own medical experts, I believe the majority stretches
beyond its capability and knowledge to adequately judge this case
and, in effect, ignores the fundamental purpose of the medical
panel in arriving at its conclusion.
Also, Section 35-1-77 (2) (d) states rather clearly that "The
commission may base its finding and decision on the report of the
panel . . . but is not bound by the report if other substantial
conflicting evidence in the case supports a contrary finding".
(underline added for emphasis) In this instant case, the medical
panel reviewed all the medical facts including the opinion of the
insurance company's paid reviewing medical doctors. The panel also
examined the claimant. There is no other substantial conflicting
evidence. (underline added for emphasis)
My reading of this
statutory language is that the legislature has allowed the
Commission to use medical panel reports as the foundation of its
findings regarding medical issues. By adding the other language of
"not bound by" and "if" regarding "other substantial conflicting
evidence", the legislature restricted the Commission's discretion
normally allowed by the use of the word "may".
Therefore,
following the premise of this reading, I would conclude that my
colleagues' decision may not be consistent with the requirements of
the statute.

/7#,

DATED THIS / / *"* day of March, 1997

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Industrial Commission to reconsider this
Order by filing a request for reconsideration with the Industrial
Commission. Any such request for reconsideration must be received
by the Industrial Commission within 20 days of the date of this
order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah
Court of Appeals by filing a petition for review with that court
within 30 days of the date of this order.
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I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Granting Motion
For Review in the matter of Lori Warner ,^Case No. 95-0555, was
mailed first class postage prepaid this / /ffiday of February, 1997,
to the following:
LORI WARNER
7655 SOUTH 10TH EAST
MIDVALE, UTAH 84047
PHILLIP B. SHELL
DAY SHELL & LILJENQUIST, L. C.
4 5 EAST VINE STREET
MURRAY, UTAH 84107
THEODORE E. KANELL
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
4 TRIAD CENTER SUITE 500
P 0 BOX 2970
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110-2970
MERIT MEDICAL SYSTEMS
16 0 0 WEST MERIT PARK WAY
SOUTH JORDAN, UTAH 84 0 95
TIG INSURANCE
6 925 UNION PARK CENTER #42 0
MIDVALE, UTAH 84047

zt^~^2tzAeJ\
Adell Butlef-Mitchell
Support Specialist
Industrial Commission of Utah
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
LORI WARNER,

*
*
*

Applicant,
vs.

*

MERIT MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC.
and TIG INSURANCE CO.,

*
*

ORDER DENYING REQUEST
FOR RECONSIDERATION

Case No. 95-0555

*

Defendants.

*

Lori Warner asks The Industrial Commission of Utah to reconsider its prior decision denying
Ms. Warner's claim for benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
The Industrial Commission exercises jurisdiction over Ms. Warner's request for
reconsideration pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-13 and Rule R568-1-4.0, Utah Administrative
Code.
ISSUES PRESENTED
Did the Industrial Commission err in concluding that Ms. Warner had failed to establish that
her work at Merit Medical Systems, Inc. was the legal and medical cause of the injuries for which
she now seeks workers' compensation benefits.
DISCUSSION
In her request for reconsideration, Ms. Warner raises the same issues that the Industrial
Commission considered in reaching its prior decision in this matter. Having once more reviewed
the facts of Ms. Warner's claim, the Industrial Commission again concludes that Ms. Warner has
failed to establish either legal causation or medical causation in her claim for workers' compensation
benefits. The Industrial Commission therefore reaffirms its prior decision denying Ms. Warner's
application.
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ORDER
The Industrial Commission reaffirms its prior decision in this matter and denies Ms.
Warner's request for reconsideration. It is so ordered.
DATED this2yv& day of May, 1997.

R. Lee fcllertson
Chairman

Colleen S. Colton
Commissioner

4£^

DISSENT
I dissent from the majority's conclusion that Ms. Warner has not established medical
causation, for the reasons expressed in my dissent from the Indu^tijal Commission's previous
decision in this matter.

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for review
with that court within 30 days of the date of this order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Request For Reconsideration in the
matter of Lori Warner, Case No. 95-0555, was mailed first class postage prepaid this^n|rday of
May, 1997, to the following:
LORI WARNER
7655 SOUTH 10TH EAST
MIDVALE, UTAH 84047
PHILLIP B. SHELL
DAY SHELL & LILJENQUIST, L. C.
45 EAST VINE STREET
MURRAY, UTAH 84107
THEODORE E. KANELL
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
4 TRIAD CENTER SUITE 500
P O BOX 2970
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110-2970
MERIT MEDICAL SYSTEM
1600 WEST MERIT PARK WAY
SOUTH JORDAN, UTAH 84095
TIG INSURANCE
6925 UNION PARK CENTER #420
MIDVALE, UTAH 84047

^"Adell Butler-Mitchell
Support Specialist
Industrial Commission
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